Saturday, April 21, 2012

CCC Kevin Spratt Taser Inquiry concludes

The CCC this week finished its inquiry into the mistreatment of Kevin Spratt
when he was arrested and detained in 2008, by Perth police and
the Emergency Support Group(ESG).

Playing it safe, the "corruption watchdog" only recommended charges be

considered against the two police who had already been disciplined in
internal proceedings, despite the life-threatening injuries Spratt had to
be hospitalized for, after he was transferred to prison.

Spratt was hospitalized following his transfer to prison, with at least one
fractured rib and a collapsed lung and pneumothorax, a dislocated right
shoulder, and a comminuted (multiple breaks) fracture of the
humerus(upper arm).
One ESG officer at the inquiry asserted Spratt had thrown himself
around the back of the ESG prison transport van.








The reasoning behind the recommendation for criminal charges seems to be,
that the two Police officers tasered Kevin Spratt "at least 12 times" at the
Perth Watch House on 31 August 2008, although, CCTV and taser data
uncovered during the inquiry showed that Spratt was tasered up to 41 times
in one week by various WAPS and DCS ESG officers.


"As mentioned above, in total there were 14 deployments of
Taser weapons on 31 August 2008 at the PWH by WAPOL officers.
Nine of these deployments were video recorded...while five
deployments were not recorded as they occurred in the
padded cell. iv Senior Constable Tomlin was responsible
for the first four deployments and Senior Constable Strahan
was, according to Taser Data Port download records,
responsible for 10 deployments (five during the period
12:09:57 p.m. and 12:10:48 p.m. and five after that period
in the padded cell). However, this is disputed by Senior
Constable Strahan who gave evidence during a public examination
that his “recollection was” that it was only “three times” in
the padded cell, that is, eight (and not 10) deployments overall.
v Thirteen of the deployments were in the “Drive-Stun” Mode,
which affects the Sensory Nervous System and causes pain to
the subject, but does not achieve incapacitation in the same
manner as “Probe” Mode. vi" (Report page xiii)  

The CCC report said the Senior Constables' use of the tasers against Spratt, was
"an undue and excessive use of force which was unreasonable and unjustified."
The Acting Commissioner, Mark Herron, said any reasonable person viewing a
video in which Police tasered Kevin Spratt nine times in a little over a minute
"is left with a feeling of considerable disquiet, if not outrage."




A footnote in the report said, "There is no recorded
footage of Mr Kevin John Spratt in the padded cell at the
Perth Watch House (PWH) on 31 August 2008, as, for privacy
reasons, the cell is monitored in real time, via CCTV cameras.
Prisoners detained in the padded cell at the PWH, often have
their clothing removed for safety reasons.
(Report page xiii, footnote iv)"  



He said the report also criticised a Police Internal Affairs Unit investigation into
the matter.

“While the Commission found no misconduct, the internal investigation did not
resolve inconsistencies between a Police summary of the facts around the
incident, and other documentation and the video,” he said.

 
Inconsistencies in one officer's Statement of Material Facts(SMF) about incidents
at the Perth Watch House, presented to the court that convicted Spratt in 2008,
resulted in his exoneration last year on that conviction, for obstructing officers
(the ones who tasered him).

Constable Fowler told the Commissioner he was misinformed about the events
that took place at the Watch House and wrote his SMF based on what his colleagues
had said. Fowler was told by an IAU officer that the SMF was false,
on 25 September 2008.

"The relevant section of the SMF relating to the additional
charge of Obstruct a Public Officer reads:
Upon arrival at the Perth watch-house the accused was initially
calm and cooperative with police and was walked into the main
area without incident where he was given several drinks of water.…
'His handcuffs were removed from the seat and he was requested
to accompany police for a strip-search. The accused began to
resist by holding onto the seat and by bracing his arms.
Police tried to move him from the seat when he began resisting
against police. He again became violent and aggressive towards
police who were attempting to restrain him by kicking and flailing
his arms towards police as they approached him…
The Taser was deployed to prevent any injury to the police or
the accused however it initially had little effect with the
accused continuing to violently resist against police trying
to restrain him. The accused was taken to the padded cell where
he continued his violent aggressive behaviour ...' 110"



The CCC decided the provision of an inaccurate statement of material fact to the court
by Fowler, which he disclosed fully at the hearings, did not constitute misconduct.

The report states the SMF was false in regards to the circumstances under which taser
use was initiated against Spratt at the Perth Watch House because the CCTV footage
showed he was not acting aggressively - to the contrary.


"The Commission notes that Mr Spratt did not plead guilty to the additional
charge of Obstruct a Public Officer until 1 December 2008.

Therefore, there had been ample time to amend the SMF prior to that time
or to seek to withdraw the charge either before 1 December 2008 or
30 January 2009 (the date upon which the conviction of Mr Spratt on the
charge was recorded).

The Commission also notes that neither of the IAU investigators who interviewed
1/C Constable Fowler on 25 September 2008, nor the WA Police Union representative
present during the interview, have any recollection of 1/C Constable Fowler’s
comments about the inaccuracy of the SMF and the need to amend it.
However, the Commission considers that this does not necessarily mean that
the comments were not made by 1/C Constable Fowler."
 
The CCC said the investigation followed the 2010 release of their research report

on the Police use of tasers, and included public hearings in 2010 and 2011 into the
use of tasers on Kevin Spratt. However, the inquiry was ordered by the then
commissioner, coincidentally, the day after the 2010 Rally for Humaneness,
when WA Shadow Attorney General, John Quigley, exposed to bystanders the
scar on Spratt's chest from him being intubated for a fractured rib/collapsed lung.
Prior to that event, there had been little disclosure and some considerable
sidestepping by the government departments, not least of which, resulted in
a wrongful conviction.



At that point, the CCC Commissioner, extraordinarily, ordered the
immediate cessation of all internal investigations by both public sector
agencies.



One Police Internal Affairs officer later became a specific subject of
 the inquiry for a half-hearted investigation of Fowler's inaccurate SMF,
which drew one recommendation for WAPS reform.

The report said Kevin Spratt was also tasered 11 times on 6 September

2008 by ESG(ESG) officers from the Department of Corrective Services
(DCS) while being removed from a cell in the Perth Watch House.

"Seven of those uses were reasonable and while no finding was made

in regard to the other four due to insufficient evidence, the report
expressed concern about them.

Concern was also expressed about whether sufficient consideration

was given to the use of negotiation and conflict resolution
techniques," the CCC stated.

“9] In total there were 11 deployments of Taser weapons
on Mr Spratt at the PWH on 6 September 2008 during the
cell extraction by ESG officers. Senior Officer B was
responsible for four deployments and Senior Officer A
for seven deployments. According to Taser Data Port
download records, the 11 deployments occurred between
14:18:15 and 14:21:40. Two deployments were in “Probe Mode”
(one by Senior Officer B at (report page xiii) 14:18:15
and one by Senior Officer A at 14:19:21) and nine
deployments were in the “Drive-Stun” Mode (three by
Senior Officer B and six by Senior Officer A, at times
indicated in Table 2 above). In all, Taser weapons were
deployed for a total of 53 seconds of shock over a period
of 205 seconds, with a Taser weapon deployed on average
every 18.36 seconds. Senior Officer B was responsible for
four deployments during a 53-second period, with a total
of 18 seconds of shock, and Officer A was responsible for
seven deployments during a 139-second period with a total
of 35 seconds of shock. There was a 13-second gap between
the last deployment by Senior Officer B and the first
deployment by Senior Officer A.(report page xiv)”

The media release about the report said -
"the report concluded that the release of a controversial “Timeline” of

Mr Spratt’s contact with Police was not misconduct." However, the report
said inaccuracies in the “Timeline” should have been corrected before it
was released. The CCC accepted the evidence of Police Commissioner
Karl O'Callaghan who suggested the "Timeline" was released to preserve
public confidence in WAPS "as there was a lot of misinformation in the
 public domain about the events surrounding Mr Spratt."

However due to the incorrect information in the “Timeline” greater

misinformation resulted from the police “Timeline.”

Essentially, what the CCC said, was that the WAPS "Timeline"

purporting to clarify the facts, actually didn't.






The CCC also said the impact of the "Timeline" in making Spratt's offending
look worse than it was, was not WAPS’ intent when they conceived it and
 released it to the public.


The false information in Constable Fowler's statement of facts, presented to
the judge in 2008 (for which there was also no punitive action taken by the
courts or the CCC against any officers who allegedly supplied incorrect
information to Fowler), as well as Internal Affairs' alleged instruction to
Fowler to "leave it," when he asked how to fix the discrepancies uncovered
 in his SMF cast doubts over the intent behind the police public relations release.
Intentionally or not, the release had an effect in the public's eyes and in the
court's, and Mr O'Callaghan said that it was intended to restore public
confidence in WAPS officers.

The CCC concluded that though progress was made by WAPS and ESG in
implementing urgent reforms, the completion of that process would take
time, and so the body will be monitoring and reviewing conditions on an
ongoing basis for an indefinite period.
The CCC's recommendations were:
Recommendation 1

WAPS review the Use of Force Reports process and establish procedures to ensure they

comply with regulations in the Police Manual; and a record of submission is maintained by
 the Officer-in-Charge, manager or supervisor.

Officers-in-Charge, managers or supervisors should undertake cross-checks of the details

contained in each Use of Force Report and the associated Taser Data Port download record,
as part of the assessment of the Use of Force Report and the circumstances during which
the Taser weapon was used.

Recommendation 2

WAPS review IAU investigation processes and procedures to ensure relevant documentation,

such as Major Incident Briefing Notes, Use of Force Reports and any other reports, Crime and
Occurrence Books and Statements of Material Facts (where applicable), and any other relevant
evidence, such as CCTV footage, are reviewed and cross-checked to ensure consistency -
and where inconsistencies are determined, any matters related to the outcome of
investigations be reviewed in light of the identified inconsistencies.

This includes charges which are brought in the context of an IAU investigation, which should

be monitored and reviewed to ensure that the facts upon which the charges are based are
 accurate.

Recommendation 3

WAPS review the process by which it is determined officers should be charged with disciplinary

 offences and/or criminal offences to ensure that:
* all relevant material is taken into account during the
decision-making process;
* reasons for the decision are clearly documented; and
the complainant is advised in writing of the outcome of the decision-making process to

avoid any misunderstanding about the planned course of action.
Recommendation 4

WAPS continue to evaluate Perth Watch House work practices and reporting systems

to enhance efficiency and accountability, and it is the intention of the Commission to
monitor and review the action undertaken, including the action outlined in a letter to the
Commission of 4 July 2011 relating to custodial care, issue of Taser weapons,
nursing services and cell extractions by ESG.

Recommendation 5

DCS review the shortcomings outlined in the report, regarding video recording and

reporting of incidents involving the use of force by ESG officers, and undertake
appropriate action to address those shortcomings to ensure compliance with the
requirements of Prisons Use of Force and Deployment of Tasers Policies. 
The specific shortcomings set out in this report relate to the:

* failure to include in the video recording of the cell extraction of Mr Spratt on

6 September 2008 the “briefing of the cell extraction team and the operation of
the cell extraction (including the mediation process)” as required by PD5 and
Instruction A19; and
* inconsistencies between Incident Description Reports and Video footage in

relation to the cell extractions of both Mr Spratt on 6 September 2008 and
 Prisoner X on 2 August 2010.

Further, in the view of the Commission the above specific shortcomings may be

indicative of the need for broader systemic improvements that need to be addressed
by DCS to ensure compliance with the requirements of PD5 and Instruction A19,
 particularly in relation to reporting and review of Incident Description Reports and
Video footage, and recording of incidents and preparation for incidents involving the
use of force by ESG and other authorised officers.

The Commission is concerned that, if proper care and attention is not given to the

preparation for deployment of Taser weapons and the subsequent accurate reporting
 of incidents involving the use of Taser weapons, the need to comply with relevant
processes and procedures will in time be ignored.

DCS should undertake a systemic review of current processes and procedures, to

 ensure compliance with the requirements of PD5 and Instruction A19.

Recommendation 6

DCS to consider allowing more time to the Standards and Review Branch, for

analysis of incidents involving the use of Taser weapons where circumstances
 prevent the review from occurring “within one week of the incident” as presently
prescribed.

DCS should, however, in all circumstances, ensure that the review process allows the

 reviewer to critically evaluate any written reports and Video footage and, if necessary,
 interview individual officers in relation to the use of force incidents,
and prepare a review report.

"Nonetheless, the review process should be both effective and efficient, including being

completed without delay in order to ensure that the review is contemporaneous."

Recommendation 7

DCS consider amending the Use of Force Policy to give prisoners sufficient time to comply

with instructions, for officers to use negotiation and conflict resolution techniques, and to
issue a warning to prisoners when the Use of Force by officers is imminent.

Recommendation 8

DCS review the period of time officers can be attached to the ESG and consider

introducing a tenure period for officers attached to the ESG.

Recommendation 9

DCS review internal processes and procedures relating to the operation of the

Infirmary within the Casuarina Prison Health Centre, and infirmaries within other prisons,
with respect to the assessment of a patient’s medical condition and the provision and
availability of services or avenues for investigation that would assist with the timely
and accurate determination of the cause(s) of a patient’s complaints, thereby facilitating
the provision of appropriate and adequate nursing and medical care.

Monday, April 09, 2012

Holiday news reporting

The differences between the MSM in Australia and overseas are at times sadly obvious with this story picked up from a news wire two days after the story ran in Sri Lanka about the 42 y/o Australian activist's abduction.

Reporter Udul Premarathne's story - chockablock with detail - cites there were 29 abductions in the last two months similar in nature to allegations in the case of the missing Australian, & 56 abductions since December.

Meanwhile...more or less oblivious to our own culture of censorship by spin and poor industry conditions, Aussie journalists pressed on stoically, amid redundancies and dwindling staff numbers, digging deep for bland "breaking Easter news" covers about IVF babies, car crashes and flower shows.

Sri Lankan police said that they did not conduct a raid targeting him and that they had no record Gunaratnam ever entered the country.

In the story Premakumar Gunaratnam's contacts said he diligently reported his locations everyday, as well as any changes to his mobile phone number, due to his concerns that secret police posed a serious threat to activist safety.

Gunaratnam's wife alleged he was kidnapped by two dozen men, who also vandalized his home and car during the attack.

The accusations that follow the Columbo Telly story seem no less inflammatory than those endured in Australia's online MSM, & spell out an argument for better control of reader comment.

##So the missing man is returning to Australia - reported today(thanks for the heads-up). The Hindu added some interesting complexity into the he-said she-said argy bargy. The Columbo Times said the other head of that group who disappeared at the same time has also been freed. In contrast, Agency France Presse claimed in the wake of the abduction of the two people, that the Australian activist was a "radical" who outstayed his visa by five months - no mention of that in India or Sri Lanka, though, interestingly.